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FREEDOM OF INFORMATION 
LEGISLATION IN AUSTRALIA:  
A REVIEW 





reedom of information legislation was introduced at the 
federal level in Australia in enactment of the Freedom of 
Information Act 1982 (“FOI Act”). Within the decade that 
followed, freedom of information legislation was introduced in each 
State and Territory in Australia, substantially based on the original 
model of the federal FOI Act.1 The federal and New South Wales 
(“NSW”) legislation underwent substantial changes in 2009 to 2010. 
In May 2013, the federal Attorney-General announced that Australia 
had joined the Open Government Partnership (“OGP”). After a 
change of government, Australia’s commitment to the OGP was not 
progressed. In November 2015 after a change of Prime Minister, 
the new Prime Minister stated that Australia remained committed 
to the OGP. However, Australia failed to provide a national 
action plan for three plan cycles, from 2014 to 2016.   
By letter dated 13 November 2016, the Chief Executive Officer 
of the OGP advised Australia that its failure to provide a national 
action plan was a breach of the OGP process and the breach had 
been referred to the Criteria and Standards Committee of the 
OGP Steering Committee for review of Australia’s performance.2 
The letter warned that if Australia did not submit a plan it would 
be designated an inactive member of the OGP.  
On 31 October 2016 the federal government released for public 
consultation over a period of less than three weeks, the draft of 
Australia’s First Open Government National Action Plan 2016-18 
(“Draft NAP”), containing 14 commitments for open government 
in the future. This is a draft, not yet finalised, although the OGP 
meeting commences this week. 
In light of the relevant commitments in the Draft NAP, this paper 
addresses four topics: (i) the administration, monitoring and 
review of decisions under the FOI Act; (ii) exemptions and 
grounds for refusing access; (iii) recent consideration of refusal of 
access on the “voluminous request” ground; and (iv) the 
Information Publication Scheme (“IPS”). 
                                                
1 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic); Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT); Freedom of 
Information Act 1989 (NSW), replaced by the Government Information (Public Access) 
Act 2009 (NSW); Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA); Freedom of Information Act 1992 
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§ 1 – ADMINISTRATION, MONITORING AND REVIEW 
In 2010 major reforms were introduced, by the enactment of the 
Australian Information Commissioner Act 2010 (Cth) (“AIC Act”), and 
amendments to the FOI Act made by the Freedom of Information 
Amendment (Reform) Act 2010 (Cth) (“FOI Amendment Act). 
Administrative and policy functions connected with the FOI Act 
were for the first time centralised and formalised by the 
establishment of an independent statutory agency, the Office of 
Australian Information Commissioner (“OAIC”).3 The Australian 
Information Commissioner was given overarching policy and 
advisory functions with respect to information collection, use, 
disclosure and storage.4 More specialised functions were conferred 
upon two further office-holders, the Freedom of Information 
Commissioner (“FOI Commissioner”) and the Privacy 
Commissioner. The office of Privacy Commissioner already existed 
but was brought within the structure of the OAIC.5  
The FOI Commissioner’s functions are to promote awareness and 
understanding of the FOI Act and its objects, assist agencies to 
publish information under the IPS, issue guidelines under s 93A of 
the FOI Act, make recommendations relating to legislative change 
or desirable administrative action, monitor compliance by agencies, 
and collect statistics about FOI matters. Most importantly, the new 
FOI Commissioner was given power to review an “IC reviewable 
decision”, being an agency decision to refuse access to documents 
requested, with investigative powers including a broad discretion to 
conduct the review on the papers, and power to make a 
determinative decision on the merits.6 There is no necessity for the 
agency decision to have been previously the subject of an internal 
review.  
External merits review of FOI determinations had been available in 
the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“AAT”) since the FOI Act 
commenced.7 Review by the AAT was available only after an 
internal review within the agency. A further avenue of review of an 
FOI determination was by making a complaint to the 
Commonwealth Ombudsman. The AAT now has jurisdiction to 
provide second tier merits review, of a determination made by the 
FOI Commissioner in an IC review, or a decision by the FOI 
Commissioner not to review an IC reviewable decision.8 Appeals 
                                                
3 Australian Information Commissioner Act 2010 (Cth) ss 5, 14 (1). 
4 Australian Information Commissioner Act 2010 (Cth) s 7. 
5 Australian Information Commissioner Act 2010 (Cth) ss 14 (2), 14 (4). 
6 Australian Information Commissioner Act 2010 (Cth); FOI Act ss 55, 55A-55G, 55K, 55R-
55Z. The model of an information commissioner, already adopted in Queensland and 
Western Australia, had been recommended by the Australian Law Reform Commission 
as a preferred form of review of FOI determinations: Australian Law Reform 
Commission and Administrative Review Council Open Government – A Review of the 
Federal FOI Act 1982 ALRC Report No 77 (20 January 1996) Chapter 6; Appendix D 
Recommendations 18-27. 
7 FOI Act ss 57 – 58AA; Archives Act s 43. 
8 FOI Act s 57A (1). The FOI Commissioner may decide not to undertake an IC review 
or not continue it, where, inter alia, the Commissioner is satisfied that the interests of 
administration of the FOI Act make it desirable that the decision be considered by the 
AAT: FOI Act s 54W (b). 
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on questions of law lie to the Federal Court, either directly from 
the FOI Commissioner or from the AAT.9  
In practice external merits review has been diverted from the AAT 
to the FOI Commissioner. With the establishment of the two-tier 
system of external review, the volume of cases coming before the 
AAT has markedly reduced.10 While no fee applied in the case of 
an IC review, an application for review by the AAT attracted a 
filing fee of $861. On the other hand, there developed a significant 
backlog of cases pending before the FOI Commissioner.  
The Review of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 and Australian 
Information Commissioner Act 2010 (July 2013) (“Hawke Review”) 
recorded positive responses by agencies as to the contribution 
made by the OAIC. The Hawke Review found that the funding of 
the OAIC was adequate. It noted complaints about delay in its 
investigation and adjudication of FOI complaints, without 
appreciating the seriousness of the backlog.11 The Hawke Review 
recommended that a comprehensive review of the FOI Act be 
undertaken, including the two-tier system of external review.12 The 
government has yet to respond to the Hawke Review.  
In November 2014, the government introduced into Parliament 
the Freedom of Information (New Arrangements) Bill 2014 (Cth) (“New 
Arrangements Bill”), which provided for the abolition of the offices 
of Australian Information Commissioner and the FOI 
Commissioner. The Privacy Commissioner was to be retained but 
relocated, to operate within the Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunity Commission. A Senate committee, split along party 
lines, recommended by majority that the Bill be passed.13 Some 
submissions to the committee claimed that the information 
commissioner model represents international best practice and that 
the OAIC was under-resourced from the outset, and bound to fail 
by developing a backlog in adjudications.14 Some FOI advocates, 
however, preferred the AAT as an avenue for review, criticising the 
IC review by the FOI Commissioner as too slow and as potentially 
denying procedural fairness because of its non-adversarial 
procedure.15 The Bill was passed by the House of Representatives, 
but it became clear that it would not pass through the Senate of the 
                                                
9 FOI Act s 56; Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 44 (1). The FOI 
Commissioner may also refer a question of law arising in an IC review to the Federal 
Court: FOI Act s 55H. 
10 The Ombudsman retains jurisdiction to investigate complaints about FOI 
determinations: FOI Act s 89F. 
11 Review of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 and Australian Information Commissioner 
Act 2010 (July 2013) (“Hawke Review”) pp 21-4. 
12 Review of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 and Australian Information Commissioner 
Act 2010 (July 2013) (“Hawke Review”) pp 16, 36. 
13 Australian Parliament, Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee 
Freedom of Information Amendment (New Arrangements) Bill 2014 (Commonwealth, 
November 2014). 
14 Australian Parliament, Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee 
Freedom of Information Amendment (New Arrangements) Bill 2014 (Commonwealth, 
November 2014) [2.3], [2.19]. 
15 Australian Parliament, Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee 
Freedom of Information Amendment (New Arrangements) Bill 2014 (Commonwealth, 
November 2014) [2.3]. 
Freedom of Information Legislation in Australia: a review – Margaret Allars 
– 4 – 
International Journal of Open Governments [2017 – Vol 5] 
http://ojs.imodev.org/index.php/RIGO 
Australian Parliament, where the government did not enjoy a 
majority.  
In the meantime, the federal budget announced in May 2014 
provided funding for the OAIC only to the end of 2014, projecting 
savings of $10.2 million over four years by the abolition of the 
OAIC. In December 2014 the FOI Commissioner resigned to take 
an appointment as a member of the AAT. From 2015 the Canberra 
office of the OAIC was closed. The Australian Information 
Commissioner worked from home with minimal administrative 
support from two remaining staff members in Sydney, until his 
resignation in June 2015. The 2015 budget restored half the 
funding of the OAIC, but directed most of it to privacy functions. 
The Privacy Commissioner had remained in office and performed 
the additional function of reviewing agency FOI decisions.16  
When Parliament was prorogued for federal elections on 17 April 
2016, the New Arrangements Bill lapsed. In the May 2016 federal 
budget, funding for the OAIC was restored. The Draft NAP states 
that the OAIC will be involved in implementing Commitment 3.2. 
Although the AIC Act remains unamended, still providing for the 
existence of the OAIC and three commissioners, one person 
currently holds the positions of Privacy Commissioner and Acting 
Australian Information Commissioner. The position of FOI 
Commissioner is vacant.  
With regard specifically to FOI, the Draft NAP includes as 
“Commitment 3.2: Understand the Use of Freedom of 
Information” that the Commonwealth work with the States and 
Territories in order to develop, so far as possible, coordinated 
measures for the operation of FOI legislation in Australia. That is a 
desirable objective. There will always be some differences between 
the States and Territories, even if only with regard to the inevitable 
exemption of particular agencies which will differ in each State and 
Territory. Harmonisation of FOI legislation in Australia is not 
desirable in itself. A net benefit in terms of transparency needs to 
be expected from any uniformity. Commitment 3.2 also aims to 
increase public awareness regarding the right to access government 
information under FOI legislation. This is, of course, a desirable 
objective. Practical steps including resourcing need to be identified 
in order to realise it.  
What needs to be embraced within Commitment 3.2 is an objective 
of ensuring that the functions of educational and policy work, and 
monitoring of the FOI Act, these being functions of the OAIC and 
the FOI Commissioner, be placed on a stable, sound statutory and 
administrative basis, be adequately funded, and appropriate 
appointments made to statutory offices. 
The Draft NAP “Commitment 3.1: Information Management and 
Access Laws for the 21st Century” proposes that the FOI Act be 
reviewed to ensure that it is adapted to the digital era of 
government and that it is providing a coherent framework for 
                                                
16 The FOI Commissioner and the Privacy Commissioner are empowered to exercise 
each other’s functions: Australian Information Commissioner Act 2010 (Cth) ss 11 (2), 12 (2). 
Freedom of Information Legislation in Australia: a review – Margaret Allars 
– 5 – 
International Journal of Open Governments [2017 – Vol 5] 
http://ojs.imodev.org/index.php/RIGO 
managing and accessing government information. The reference 
in Commitment 3.1 to a coherent framework appears to reflect an 
objective of improving efficiency in the processing of FOI 
requests. This includes adjudicative decision-making, both 
internal to agencies and by external review, and the policy-making 
aspects of administration of the FOI Act. While no doubt directed 
to improving efficiency in the processing of FOI requests, 
Commitment 3.1 also refers to, and apparently approves, a 
general recommendation made by the Independent Review of Whole-
of-Government Internal Regulation: Report to the Secretaries Committee on 
Transformation (August 2015) (“Belcher Red Tape Review”) for a 
simpler and more coherent legislative framework for managing 
and accessing government information in a digital environment, 
through staged reforms. This approval may indicate a goal of 
implementing the limited number of recommendations made in 
the Belcher Red Tape Review specific to the topic of FOI. 
Belcher Recommendation 17.3 (i) is that reporting by agencies to 
the OAIC should be done on an annual rather than a quarterly 
basis. This appears to be a reasonable proposal for change to 
current administrative practice. 
Belcher Recommendation 17.3 (ii) is to prioritise implementation 
of recommendations made by the Review of the Freedom of 
Information Act 1982 and Australian Information Commissioner 
Act 2010 (July 2013) (“Hawke Review”) to reduce the regulatory 
burden imposed on agencies by the operation of the FOI Act. The 
recommendations specifically mentioned are Hawke 
Recommendations 21 (a), 7, 8 and 9. Hawke Recommendation 21 
(a) is for the introduction of “administrative access schemes”, by 
which information of a kind that is regularly released is made 
available on request, without the need for any formal access 
application under the FOI Act. Such arrangements are to be 
encouraged, provided that they do not entail any loss of rights of 
review in a case where the agency does not actually release the 
information sought.  
Hawke Recommendations 7, 8 and 9 are that procedures for 
seeking an extension of the 30-day period for processing a request 
should be streamlined, including by removing the need to notify 
the OAIC when the requester agrees to an extension; restricting 
the OAIC’s role in approving extensions; amending s 15AA of 
the FOI Act to enable extensions beyond an additional 30 days, 
with the agreement of the requester; calculation of “days” as 
working days rather than calendar days; and extensions of time by 
up to 30 days without the need for agreement in cases where the 
cabinet document exemption is claimed.  
Procedures for obtaining an extension of time should not be 
cumbersome. However, no justification has been offered for 
facilitating extensions of the period of time allowed for 
processing FOI requests. The goal of achieving transparency may 
in many circumstances be largely defeated by lengthy processing 
periods.  
Freedom of Information Legislation in Australia: a review – Margaret Allars 
– 6 – 
International Journal of Open Governments [2017 – Vol 5] 
http://ojs.imodev.org/index.php/RIGO 
Belcher Recommendation 17.1 (i) is that agencies subject to the 
FOI Act should examine their FOI practices to ensure that they 
impose the least burdensome mechanisms for responding to FOI 
requests. The concerned here is with efficiency and good 
administration rather than any proposal that the FOI Act be 
amended. 
§ 2 – EXEMPTIONS AND GROUNDS FOR REFUSING ACCESS TO 
DOCUMENTS 
The FOI Amendment Act clarified the provisions relating to 
exemptions. Exemptions are listed in Divisions 2 and 3 
respectively of Part IV of the FOI Act. Division 2 lists classes of 
documents that are simply exempt and contain no public interest 
test.17 These were exemptions left untouched by the FOI 
Amendment Act18 The exemptions in this group are: documents 
affecting national security, defence or international relations;19 
cabinet documents;20 documents affecting law enforcement and 
protection of public safety;21 documents to which breach of 
secrecy provisions of specified other statutes apply;22 documents 
subject to legal professional privilege;23 documents whose 
disclosure would constitute an actionable breach of confidence;24 
parliamentary budget office documents;25 documents disclosure of 
which would be contempt of court or infringe parliamentary 
privilege;26 documents disclosing trade secrets or commercially 
valuable information;27 and electoral rolls and related documents.28 
Division 3 of Part IV lists classes of “conditionally exempt” 
documents. A conditionally exempt document is exempt if, 
applying the public interest test in s 11A (5), access to the 
document “would, on balance, be contrary to the public 
interest”.29 These classes of documents are: Commonwealth–State 
relations;30 deliberative process documents;31 financial and 
property interests of the Commonwealth;32 certain operations of 
agencies;33 personal privacy;34 business affairs;35 research;36 and the 
economy.37 
                                                
17 FOI Act ss 4 (1), 11A (4), table in s 31A, 31B (a).  
18 Section 33 (a) (i) of the FOI Act provides that a document is exempt if its disclosure 
“would, or could reasonably be expected to, cause damage to the security of the 
Commonwealth”. 
19 FOI Act s 33. 
20 FOI Act s 34. 
21 FOI Act s 37. 
22 FOI Act s 38, Sch 3. 
23 FOI Act s 42. 
24 FOI Act s 45. 
25 FOI Act s 45A. 
26 FOI Act s 46. 
27 FOI Act s 47. 
28 FOI Act s 47A. 
29 FOI Act ss 4(1) (definition of “exempt document”), 11A(5), 11B, 31A. 
30 FOI Act s 47B. 
31 FOI Act s 47C. 
32 FOI Act s 47D. 
33 FOI Act s 47E. 
34 FOI Act s 47F. 
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Section 11A (3) of the FOI Act provides that if a person makes a 
request in accordance with s 15 (2) and pays any charge, then the 
agency must give access. This is “mandatory access”. However, 
there is no duty to give access to an exempt document.38 Pursuant 
to s 11A (5), where access is sought to a document that is 
conditionally exempt at a particular time, the agency is to give 
access to the document “unless access to the document at that 
time would, on balance, be contrary to the public interest”. 
Section 11B sets out factors favouring access and irrelevant factors 
that must not be taken into account in applying the test.39 
Effectively, in the case of the conditional exemptions there is a 
presumption in favour of disclosure, a position that had been 
rejected in the case-law under the unamended FOI Act.40 Access 
may be given with exempt material deleted.41 A table in s 31A 
summarises the effect of s 11A. 
The factors favouring access, set out in s 11B (3), are that access 
to the document would: “(a) promote the objects of Act (including 
all the matters set out in sections 3 and 3A; (b) inform debate on a 
matter of public importance; (c) promote effective oversight of 
public expenditure; or (d) allow a person to access his or her own 
personal information.” Section 11B (4) expressly requires that 
certain factors not be taken into account in determining whether 
access would on balance, be contrary to the public interest. These 
factors are that: (a) access could result in embarrassment to the 
Commonwealth government or cause a loss of confidence in the 
Commonwealth government42 (b) access could result in a person 
misinterpreting or misunderstanding the document; (c) the author 
of document is of high seniority in the agency to which the 
request was made; (d) access could result in confusion or 
unnecessary debate. 
While not included in s 11B as an element of the public interest 
test, a further provision naturally forms part of it. This is the 
provision in s 11 (2) that subject to the FOI Act, a person’s right of 
access is not affected by any reasons the person gives for seeking 
access; or the agency’s belief as to what are the requester’s reasons 
for seeking access.  
Belcher Recommendation 17.3 (iii) is that to enhance the 
operation of the FOI Act consideration should be given to issues 
raised about exemptions and the scope of access to information 
under the FOI Act. The only exemption specifically mentioned in 
the Belcher Red Tape Review is the exemption in s 47 with respect to 
                                                                                                    
35 FOI Act s 47G. 
36 FOI Act s 47H. 
37 FOI Act s 47J. 
38 FOI Act s 11A(4). 
39 As part of the public interest test, the Guidelines issued by the Australian Information 
Commissioner under s 93A of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (December 2010, revised 
October 2013) (“the Guidelines”) must also be taken into account: FOI Act s 11B (5). 
40 News Corporation Ltd v National Companies and Securities Commission (1984) 1 FCR 64 at 
66; Searle Australia Pty Ltd v Public Interest Advocacy Centre (1992) 108 ALR 163 at 167-8. 
41 FOI Act s 22. 
42 A similar factor operates with regard to the government of Norfolk Island: s 11B (4) 
(aa). 
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documents disclosing trade secrets or commercially valuable 
information. Section 47 is said to be too narrow and 
implementation of Hawke Recommendation 19 (a) is 
recommended. This is that s 47 should be expanded to cover any 
document that contains information about competitive 
commercial activities of agencies.  
Such an amendment does not appear to be justified by the case-
law. Section 47 contains no public interest test and is regularly 
successfully claimed by agencies for particular documents.43  
The Hawke Review recommended that the law enforcement 
exemption in s 37 of the FOI Act be revised to include the 
conduct of surveillance, intelligence gathering and monitoring 
activities, and be extended to exempt documents where FOI is 
used as an alternative to discovery in legal proceedings or 
investigations by regulatory agencies.44 However, it is questionable 
whether the broad language of s 37 is inadequate to protect from 
disclosure modern surveillance and intelligence gathering activities.  
The scope of the exemption was recently tested when a request 
was made for information relating to investigations into Shapelle 
Corby, an Australian convicted under Indonesian law for 
importing cannabis into Bali in her boogy board bag.45 The 
requester sought to establish whether the conviction was the result 
of criminal activities of baggage handlers at Sydney International 
Airport by placing the cannabis in the boogy board bag. The AAT 
accepted that the documents were created for the purpose of a 
criminal investigation and were likely to be used by the 
prosecution as evidence. Disclosure could therefore reasonably be 
expected to prejudice proper “administration of law” within s 37 
(1) (a). The documents were also exempt under s 37 (2) (a) 
because disclosure could reasonably be expected to prejudice the 
fair trial of a person.46 
§ 3 – VOLUMINOUS REQUESTS 
Another issue of current concern is the facility for refusing an 
access request on the ground that a “practical refusal reason” 
exists in relation to the request.47 This means that either the work 
involved in processing the request would substantially and 
unreasonably divert the resources of the agency or the minister 
from the performance of functions, or the request does not 
provide information reasonably necessary to enable it to be 
                                                
43 See, for example, Re The Wilderness Society South Australia Inc and Department of the 
Environment [2016] AATA 653. 
44 Hawke Review p 45; Recommendation 11. 
45 Re Bradford and Australian Federal Police [2016] AATA 775 at [30]-[36].  
46 Another AAT decision affirmed a deemed refusal by the Australian Federal Police to 
give access to one page of documents relating to the requester’s attempts to obtain a 
transfer as an office of the AFP to a new location as part of a particular project: Re 
Smith and Australian Federal Police [2016] AATA 531 at [20]-[21]. That page, containing 
details of staffing levels at a location, was exempt under s 37 (2) (c) because disclosure 
could reasonably be expected to prejudice the maintenance or enforcement of lawful 
methods for the protection of public safety. 
47 FOI Act s 24. 
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identified.48 An agency or minister determining whether there is a 
practical refusal reason, must have regard to the resources that 
would have to be used to identify, locate or collate the documents 
within the relevant filing system, in deciding whether to grant 
access, including examining the document or consulting with any 
person or body, making copies, and notifying a determination.49 
When the Attorney-General received a request from the shadow 
Attorney-General for access to his electronic diary for a period of 
8 months in 2013 to 2014, he claimed that there was a practical 
refusal reason for refusing access. The diary entries were brief, 
giving limited information as to the date, time and identity of a 
person with whom the Attorney-General was to meet, in some 
cases with an additional description of the nature of the meeting, 
or booking references. The diary did not show related invitations, 
correspondence, or background or briefing documents. The 
principal argument was that there would be an unreasonable 
diversion of resources in that it would be necessary to go behind 
each of the 1930 diary entries and work out whether by disclosure 
of some pattern the entry might unreasonably disclose personal or 
business information of the kind that requires consultation with 
the person concerned.50 This was claimed to require 228 to 630 
hours. The AAT rejected the contention, holding that it was not 
necessary for the Attorney-General’s FOI delegate to consult 
every one of the 263 persons and businesses named in the diary in 
relation to these brief and anodyne entries relating to 
appointments and work arrangements, now 18 months old.51  
The Full Federal Court upheld the AAT’s decision.52 The only 
relevant factual issue for the AAT in applying the test of 
substantial and unreasonable diversion of resources concerned the 
resources that would be required to comply with the consultation 
requirements. The question posed by the provision was whether it 
appeared to the AAT that a person “might reasonably wish to 
make an exemption contention”.53 The AAT did not err in 
concluding that there must be some rational basis which it could 
discern for the third party’s belief that the disclosure of the 
document would, or could be expected to, unreasonably affect 
him or her in respect of his or her lawful business or professional 
affairs, and a rational basis for the agency or minister’s opinion or 
                                                
48 FOI Act ss 15(2)(b), 24AA(1). 
49 FOI Act s 24AA(2). 
50 The FOI Act requires an agency or minister to consult with a person who might 
reasonably wish to contend that a document requested is conditionally exempt in that it 
contains that person’s personal information and that access would on balance be 
contrary to the public interest: FOI Act s 27A (1). In a similar fashion consultation is 
required where a person, organisation or proprietor of an undertaking might reasonably 
wish to contend that a document requested is conditionally exempt under the business 
documents exemption and access would, on balance, be contrary to the public interest: 
FOI Act s 27. 
51 Re Dreyfus and Secretary, Attorney-General’s Department [2015] AATA 995 at [42], [46] per 
Jagot J. 
52 Attorney-General v Honourable Mark Dreyfus [2016] FCAFC 119 per Besanko, Robertson 
and Griffiths JJ. 
53 FOI Act ss 27(1)(b), 27A(1)(b). 
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belief that the person might reasonably wish to make an 
exemption contention. It was not necessary in the case of every 
entry in the diary for the agency to consult the person in order to 
decide whether that person was to be given the opportunity to 
make an exemption contention.54 
Despite this recent encounter between the Attorney-General and 
the FOI Act, the Draft NAP contains no clear suggestion of any 
proposed change to the voluminous requests provision. 
§ 4 – INFORMATION PUBLICATION SCHEME 
When enacted in 1982, Part II of the FOI Act required agencies to 
publish information about their functions, the means by which 
individuals could participate in their policy-making processes, the 
kinds of documents they held and how individuals could make 
requests for access to them.55 Agencies were also required to make 
available for inspection or purchase manuals, guidelines and 
certain other specified types of policies.56 The scope of this 
requirement to publish policies was unclear.  
The FOI Amendment Act clarified and modernised Part II. Now the 
Information Publication Scheme (“IPS”), which is shorthand for 
the requirements of ss 8 and 8A and of the FOI Act, sets out 
requirements that are integral to the structure of FOI Act, designed 
to enable members of the public to know more about an agency 
and the information it holds, so that they are in a position to make 
FOI requests or otherwise participate in agency decision-making. 
The IPS is more specific as to the kinds of policy to be published, 
how it is to be published, including on the agency website, and 
extends the publication requirements. An agency must publish 
details of its organisation; its functions; appointments to positions; 
arrangements by which the public may make comments on policy 
proposals; information as to documents to which the agency 
routinely gives access; contact details of FOI officers; and 
“operational information”. Replacing the attempt to list policies 
with different labels, the “operational information” that is to be 
published is defined to cover information held by the agency to 
assist it in performing or exercising its functions or powers in 
making decisions or recommendations affecting members of the 
public or particular persons, entities or classes of persons or 
entities.57 It plainly includes, but is not limited to, rules, guidelines, 
practices and precedents.  
                                                
54 Attorney-General v Honourable Mark Dreyfus [2016] FCAFC 119 at [56]-[60], [65]. See also 
Re Dreyfus and Secretary, Attorney-General’s Department [2015] AATA 962, where the 
shadow Attorney-General sought access to incoming brief prepared by the Secretary of 
the Attorney-General’s Department for the newly elected liberal government. 
Exemption was claimed on the ground that the brief contained deliberative matter 
conditionally exempt under s 47C. The AAT (constituted by Bennett J) varied slightly 
the refusal to release redacted parts of the brief, holding that some factual parts were 
not exempt, and that the balancing of factors in the public interest test under s 11B (3) 
favoured not disclosing the remaining parts: at [107], [123]. 
55 Unamended FOI Act s 8. 
56 Unamended FOI Act s 9. 
57 FOI Act s 8A. 
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The intention behind the Draft NAP may possibly be found in 
Belcher Recommendations 17.1 (ii) and 17.2. Although the Draft 
NAP makes no specific reference to these recommendations, they 
are relevant to the IPS.  
Belcher Recommendation 17.1 (ii) is that agencies should consider 
more active publication of information in order to decrease FOI 
requests. The objective here appears to have been efficiency and 
good administration in the agency when discharging its 
responsibilities under the FOI Act, rather than any proposal that 
the FOI Act be amended in order to enhance transparency. The 
recommendation may be intended to be directed to the way in 
which an agency manages its duty under s 8 (2) (g) of the FOI Act. 
This provision in the IPS requires an agency to publish 
automatically on its website information which it routinely releases 
in response to requests made by individuals, unless it is personal 
information, business affairs information or information of a kind 
that the FOI Commissioner has determined by legislative 
instrument that it would be unreasonable to publish. 
Belcher Recommendation 17.2, apparently endorsed by the Draft 
NAP, is that consideration be given to whether the IPS could be 
consolidated with other government initiatives for enhancing 
public accessibility of government information, such as the digital 
transformation agenda.  
There is a danger that implementation of this recommendation 
could reverse the benefits of the IPS. It would be inappropriate to 
relocate the IPS requirements to another Act, or to dilute them to 
the status of policy requirements. 
§ 5 – POSTSCRIPT 
On 6 December 2016, this paper was delivered as part of the 
“Academic Days on Open Government Issues” at the Sorbonne 
Law School, Paris. On 7 December 2016, the first day of the 
three-day OGP Global Summit held in Paris, the Australian 
Minister for Finance announced the finalisation of Australia’s first 
NAP, and publically released the document entitled Australia’s First 
Open Government National Action Plan 2016-18 (Final NAP).  
In the Final NAP, Commitment 3.1 is expressed in terms almost 
identical to those in the Draft NAP, with similar inconclusive 
references to the Hawke Review and the Belcher Red Tape Review.58 
One additional sentence states that “[t] he government is 
committed to ensuring the adequate resourcing of the OAIC to 
discharge its statutory functions, and provided funding for the 
purpose over the next four years in the 2016-17 Budget.”59 
Commitments 3.2 and 3.3 in the Final NAP are also in terms 
similar to Commitments 3.2 and 3.3 respectively in the Draft NAP. 
  
                                                
58 Australian Government Australia’s First Open Government National Action Plan 2016-18 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2016) (Final NAP), p 36. 
59 Final NAP, pp 36-7. 
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